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SUMMARY:

Petrs claim that the Government did

~w- • \ V\!.:\CVI-

not reserve ground water rights when it withdrew Devil's

JvJ.~-~y~

Hole from the public domain in 1952, and that to permit the

C.6..~.

L)B

Government to do so now would conflict with the right of
the various Western States to control the disposition of water
within their jurisdictions.
2.

FACTS:

In 1906, Congress passed an act for the

protection of American antiquities; in 1933, Death Valley

- 2 National Monument was created under the provisions of that
act, thereby withdrawing that area from the public domain.
In 1952, President Truman, by proclamation, withdrew "a
remarkable underground pool known as Devil's Hole
the 40 acres surrounding it

. . . from

and

the public domain and

established [it] as a detached portion of Death Valley
National Monument."

The pool in Devil' s Hole was and is of

interest because it is the sole natural habitat of a "peculiar
race of desert fish" known as pupfish, ., In 1966, Congress first
•.we

legislated to protect "endangered species" of animals and in
1970 pupfish were officially declared to
species.

(

b~

an endangered

In 1968, petrs, having recently acquired a large tract

of land near Devil's Hole, began to pump underground water on
their land for use in irrigation of their cultivated land, now
about 4,000 acres; shortly

thereaft~r

the water level in Devil's

Hole began to drop, partially exposing a rock shelf on which the
pupfish were feeding and reproducing.

The Government initiated

an action to enjoin further pumping until such time as the ,court
..

could determine, through a Master, the lowest level of water
acceptable for Devil's Hole consistent with the preservation of
the pupfish.

Through somewhat protracted litigation, the

District Court concluded that a certain level was required; petrs
claim that the maintenance of that level will, in effect, put
them out of business.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs claim that certain 19th century

congressional legislation severing water rights from land in the

- 3 -

public domain and the silence of the 1952 proclamation on
the question of reservation of water rights at Devil's Hole
prevent the drawing of an inference that the 1952 proclamation
was intended to reserve the water rights for the Government.
Based on the assumed correctness of this contention, petrs argue
that they were essentially first in time in claiming the water
under state law because the Government has otherwise never
sought to perfect any claim to the water under state law, and
its only assertion of a claim must be the declaration of the
pupfish as an endangered species .in 1970, two years after petrs
began to pump the water.

(This claim appears to be based on a

common law right to the water, a right that was abolished by
I

I

\

Nevada in 1939.)

Petrs also contend that the Proclamation

./ issued in 1952 had nothing to do with pupfish, because there was
no legislation in effect at that time protecting endangered
species and that therefore the Government should not be permitted
to read into the Proclamation more than was there.

(This ap-

pears to be petrs' first contention in different dress.)

P~trs

finally contend that the only way to reserve water rights in
Nevada is to follow the state procedures, that the Government is
bound to follow state procedures and has not done so, and that
therefore the Government's claim must fail.
3.

DISCUSSION:

Petrs' first two contentions turn on

the proper interpretation of the 1952 Proclamation and the
proper construction of the 1906 Act upon which the Proclamation
was based.

The CA held that the application of the "reservation"

•,,:

4 doctrine -- the power of the Government to reserve, free
from state law, water rights for itself where public lands
are withdrawn from the public domain -- was within this
Court's decisions in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, and
United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S.
520.

This was so, said theCA, because the implied reservation

of the water rights in this case was required to accomplish the
purposes for which the land was reserved.

The third contention

made by petrs would appear to be controlled by Federal Power
Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, which held that the Government
does not have to comply with state law when reserving water on
such lando

Petrs seek to distinguish these cases by arguing that

they involved surface water as opposed to ground water, but that
distinction would seem to be of no force, since the focus of the
relevant cases is upon the Government's being able to achieve
whatever purpose it set out to achieve.

According to scholarly

authority relied on by petrs, there have been several attempts in
Congress to reverse this Court's acceptance of the implied ;
.~....-

reservation doctrine, all of which have failed.
203-204.

~

.

47 Den. L.J., at

This problem would appear to be one more congenial to

1/

the halls of Congress • -

There is a response.
5/6/75

Simms

CA 9 Opinion in Petn.

2/

- This case presents no issue remotely related to the abst ention
issue presented in Colorado Rive r Water District v. Unit e d Sta t es ,
No. 74-940, cert o grant e d, April 28, 1975, this case involvi n g a
\ rule ch&nge ana-that case involving who is to get the home court
advantage.
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1.

This petition seeks review

in No. 74-1107, Cappaert v. United States.

It is filed by

the intervenor state of Nevada, and has a somewhat different focus
It is thus necessary to write an

()._

~
\):',-

~tl--~~~
~ A::(- 7 tf-' - 'P <f 0

Federal/Civil

'1 f-tJ-o) from that of the Cappaerts .

~

~ ?-~ ......,.._,..._:r--v

.

~
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-

Cert. to CA 9
(Carter, Choy; Solomon, DJ)

~~NITED STATES

(.&g._.~

~A.,..~
k~~
.

Preliminary Memo

'

additional memo.

The issues involve the ;xtent t,? which th.5;.
C' A-1-. j j: - + {fra::l.t.t:t ~d._ '-f~~ ·
GlU_ ~ t ~9 ~'Tk ~~ c{ ~ VV'-u.lu_ --fl.~~

(U~- ~ ~ ~- ~ hr.ic_

q- ~~- ~t ~
-w~ ~ ~

A-U-

taoJ

~ ~ .:J:: w-J_f_ ---~..~ ,

p~

-2-

implied reservation doctrine may frustrate the power of arid
~

~~----------

~tat ~s

to administer their own scarce . underground water

resources, and whether the McCarran Amendment, 43

u.s.c.

§

666(a),

requires the federal government to comply with state procedures
for administering groundwater.
2.

FACTS:

Aside from the facts set forth in the Preliminary

Memo for No. 74-1107, which should be consulted, it is relevant
that prior to filing of this federal action the Cappaerts had
instituted a state proceeding for appropriation of groundwater.
The United States protested the application, and fully participated

(

in the hearing (before

~he

State Engineer) •

The State Engineer

rendered a decision to issue permits to the Cappaerts, and this
decision was not appealed by the United States.
3.

CONTENTIONS AND CA OPINION:

Petr echoes the arguments

presented by the Cappaerts that federal statutes long ago

severed ~

,

control of water from federal ownership of public lands, leaving
such control to the states.

Pursuant to this authority, petr had

devised procedures for establishing rights in water, procedures
which are as open to the
owner.

u.s.

government as to any other land

The implied reservation doctrine, as applied in this case,

completely undermines petr's authority and procedures, for it
permits the United States to re-establish control over water
rights by simply withdrawing critical portions of land from the
public domain.

This is especially troublesome with regard to

'·

(

-3-

';

underground water, since the water under any particular piece
of land is often hydrologically connected with reservoirs
covering hundreds of square miles.

TheCA dismissed petr's

claim to control of underground water with the statement that
state water laws do not apply to lands withdrawn from the
public domain, citing F.P.C. v. Oregon, 349

(1955).

u.s.

435, 444, 448

Petr contends that Oregon should not control, because

it made the distinction between public domain and reserved
land without discussion, and because the decision in that case
could have been grounded on provisions of the Federal Power

(~

Act which explicitly st~ted that certain land and appurtenant
waters should be used for power generation (there was thus no
need to imply a reservation of water rights) •

Petr goes on to

argue that cases applying the implied reservation doctrine
have on their facts been based on necessity (for power

generatio~, ,

'
for effectuating Congressional enactments for the national defense,
and for providing a living for resettled Indians), rather than on
ownership of water arising from ownership of land.

They claim

that the present result works a "demonstrable injustice," suggesting that the extinction of man is of greater importance than the
extinction of desert pupfish.
The SG contends that the implied reservation theory is well
established, poir.ting to language in Eagle County, 401

u.s.,

522-523, and Ari z ona v. Cali f ornia, 373 U.S. 546, 597-602
-~

·· ~ 11

....,,...

~,..,

f l r c.rrrm

~nn

TIIT inr r>r~

V.

U.S •.

207 U.S. 564

at

(1 963 ),

(19 0 8 ),

(

-4Petr contends that water rights have been left to the states
to control, through a single, comprehensive system of administration
and adjudication.

u.s.c.

43

It especially relies on the McCarran Amendment,

§ 666, which waives sovereign immunity as to state

proceedings for the adjudication and administration of water rights.
The CA treated the Amendment as being no more than what it purports
to be, a waiver of immunity from suit, and not as a limitation on
the fora available to the United States.

I
("----'

Nevada, 412

u.s.

u.s.

It relied on

v.

534, 538 (1973), which noted that a federal district

court had jurisdiction to hear a water rights case brought by the
United States.
'

tion to

u.s.

and

u.s.

Petr contends that the CA gave inadequate considera-

v. District Ct. for Eagle County, 401

v. District Ct. for Division No. 5, 401

u.s.

u.s.

520

527

(1971),

(1971),

which held that claims to reserved water rights could be litigated
in state courts, subject to this Court's review of federal questions.
- ',..
According to petr, these cases recognize the desirability of a

.

single, expert system for water rights determinations, and rigid
reliance on the statutory term "defendant" should not be allmved
to undermine that approach.
Seven states have filed two similar amicus briefs in support
the petn.

Aside from expressing fear that the decision imperils

their existence, they raise three points.

First, they contend

that President Truman did not have statutory authority to reserve
waters for the purpose of protecting fish

(the Antiquities Act

"•

'.

-5-

was intended to protect places and inanimate things, not wildlife,
and congressional history indicates that it was to be used sparingly,
taking only such land as "absolutely necessary").

Second, the

reservation doctrine should not be extended to percolating groundwater, since this would affect the right of adjacent landowners to
withdraw water to which they were entitled under state law.

Whereas

surface water could have been obvious to Congress at the time it
withdrew public lands, such cannot be said for groundwater.

Moreover,

the effect of groundwater removal may not be obvious for years,
during which time the adjacent landowner may well have made very
substantial good faith .investments; thus application of implied
reservation theory, rather than reliance on the emminent domain
power, could be "unconscionable."
Third, the amici raise a contention which is reserved by Nevada,
but not discussed -- that the

u.s.

is barred by collateral estoppel

arising from the unappealed state administrative proceeding.

Having

intervened in the state proceedings, the United States was stuck
with them (subject to this Court's review of federal questions),
even though it had not been formally served as a party defendant.
The CA rejected this contention on the grounds the state proceeding
was merely administrative in nature, the McCarran Amendment did
not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity save for proceedings
in which the U.S. was a defendant, and the rights of the

u.s.

not in issue since it appeared merely to explain the factual
~~a~a

nF

i~~

nnnnsi~inn

to the Cacnaert ' s application.

were

-6-

4.

DISCUSSION:

Questions regarding the Antiquities Act and

the Truman proclamation are probably too narrow to merit review,
absent some indication that this might be a recurring problem
(the reach of those documents is highly relevant to this case,
however, for the implied reservation doctrine is a matter of
congressional intent) •

The issues dealing with administration

of western groundwater strike me as somewhat more substantial.
The CA opinion is certainly plausible and defensible.

But

there are some substantial reasons for distinguishing between
surface water and groundwater, and the combination of the
\

'-

severance of control over water on public lands and the waiver
of immunity in state proceedings suggests that Congress intends
western water rights to be administered in comprehensive fashion
by the respective states, at least to the extent of binding the
United States to the results of proceedings in which it enters
an appearance.

Moreover, amicus briefs indicate that theCA's

decision may represent a very substantial and unpredictable
encroachment upon the authority of the states to ration a vital
and scarce resource.
There is a response in No. 74-1107.
6/11/75

Jacobs

CA opn in petn app.

THE McCARRAN AMENDMENT, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a)

Con:')cnt is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights
to the use of water of a river system or other source,
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where
is appears that the United States is the owner of or
is in the process of acqui1'1ng water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange,
or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary
party to such suit. The United States, when a party
to such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or
that the U nitcd States is not amenable thereto by
reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to
the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having
jurisclietion, and may obtain rcview thereof, in the
same maru1er and to the same extent as a private individual under l'iko circnmstancrs: Provided, That no
judgmrnt for costs shall he entrrcd again:')t the United
States in :my such suit.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO FROM PENNY CLARK

~ fV''l:)

No. 74-940 presents the following issue:

7 ~- / 3> t>L{
whether a

federal court should abstain ianast:tiaai:ai. &@! in an action brought
by the United States to adjudicate water rights, deferring to
the State's comprehensive machinery for adjudicating and
administering rights to scarce water resources.

--

That is not

the same issue presented in 74-1304 and 74-1107, although one
issue raised by 73-1304 is close.

The primary issue in this

pair of cases is whether the implied reservation doctrine
(which ._ turns on congressional intent to reserve water rights
along with land) should apply (a) to underground water, or (b)
in states that have machinery for adjudicating water rights
between

-

I£&2£@1&

competi~ laimants.

By themselves these issues . . . .

offer no strong reason for reversing the decision below;

I suspect they both would be answered in the affirmative if
taken on the merits.
another issue:

--------

The petition in 73-1304, however, raises

whether the United States, having participated

in a state adjudication of water rights, should be bound by
that decision, or may later institute its own action in &L&ba:
.._.federal court for adjudication of its rights under
law.

feqe~al

This issue is a close relative to that in 74-940; the

broad question is the same (how to reconcile federal water
claims with state apportionment systems) , but in one the question
is how the federal court should act, and in the other it is
what effect the state proceeding should have on the federal

"'

...

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO FROM PENNY CLARK
No. 74-940 presents the following issue:
federal court should abstain iaaamiaaizi.

@§

whether a

in an action brought

by the United States to adjudicate water rights, deferring to
the State's comprehensive machinery for adjudicating and
administering rights to scarce water resources.

--

That is not

the same issue presented in 74-1304 and 74-1107, although one
issue raised by 73-1304 is close.

The primary issue in this

pair of cases is whether the implied reservation doctrine
(which ._ turns on congressional intent to reserve water rights
along with land) should apply (a) to underground water, or (b)
in states that have machinery for adjudicating water rights
between

competi~ laimants.

By themselves these issues . . . .

nanga offer no strong reason for reversing the decision below;

I suspect they both would be answered in the affirmative if
taken on the merits.
another issue:

---------

The petition in 73-1304, however, raises

whether the United States, having participated

in a state adjudication of water rights, should be bound by

'

,.

that decision, or may later institute its own action in aaats
~

federal court for adjudication of its rights under federal

law.

This issue is a close relative to that in 74-940; the

broad question is the same (how to reconcile federal water
claims with state apportionment systems), but in one the question
is how the federal court should act, and in the other it is
what effect the state proceeding should have on the federal
claim.

MIIRII"R:IIII8RnJ!!ni!Hnna:l::nnBJni:in:HaHnn8kll~maii~:R8nf!lX&fiJtxfxawx

.. . .

2

The decision in 74-940 will not dictate the outcome
in these petitions, although it might . . . . be close enough

I

to warrant holding these petitions and remanding to the
, for reconsideration,
Court of Appea1s7following decision in t 74-940. Or, if •
you want to devote the time to two cases (more economicalf'"6-"·;f~i"'ti
..f.wo d.A.ssi ~llr& c.ac;e..s...
c_Q._ne or both of ,
A of course)) since the it1an:es &IS similailfthese pet1f1ons
could be granted and set for argument with 74-940.

If this

is the favored course, I would grant No. 74-1304, which
more closely presents the "res judicata" issue, and hold

74-1107.

I would also ask the parties to brief the question

of what effect participation in the

state~~. . . .~£. .

proceeding

should have (or perhaps . . even limit the grant to that issue).

11
;

htw If 74-1304 is granted, nothing would be

'81••

gained by granting 74-1107 along with it.
The decision whether to grant, hold, or deny is a

{

' c~ne.

Perhaps •one of the most persuasive factors

should be the current state of the Court's docket for next
Term:

whether it is such that you can afford the luxury

of having two related cases, or whether you should take only
one and hope to resolve the basic question of conflict
between federal claims and state adjudicatory machinery.
penny
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

- t} J'-f
TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Greg Palm

DATE:

October 31, 1975

Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 CAppaert v. United States["Pupfish"]
I had hoped to finish this memo prior to argument.

But I

still have not had time to consider fully the res judicata issues.
As to those my initial impression

was that CA 9 was correct and

that the Government Brief contains several bases upon which CA 9's
decis·i on on that score might be affirmed.
On the"tre rits" I think the decision be low should be affirmed.
I.

Federal Reservation Doctrine:

The prior decisions of this Court establish that
b ~rese~v ~~blic

lands the United States may also reserve such

appurtenant unappropriated waters as are necessary to accomplish
the purposes for which the reservation was created.

Arizona v.

California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-602 (1963); United States v. Powers,
305 U.S. 527, 528 (1939); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,
575-7 8 (1908).

Two factors are determinative in the assessment

of whether the United States has established a prior claim to a
particular water source:

(1)

Intent:

it must be shown that

the United States intended to reserve certain water rights when it

2.

reserved theretofore public lands, and (2) Necessity:

the

appurtenant water rights reserved must be necessary to serve
the future requirements of the reserved land.

As will be

--

developed below I think that although this is a relatively
"easy" case in terms of the necessity branch of the doctrine,
it is important that the Court establish an ascertainable
standard by which competing private water users can estimate
the amounts of water the United States may validly claim in
the future as required for the development of the reserved public
land.

Otherwise, an unnecessary amount of uncertainty will be

created so that investment development in Western States may be
unfairly impeded.
Prior to engaging in the intent/necessity analysis
that is vital to the resolution of reserved water-rights cases,
two contentions relating to whether the doctrine should be
inapplicable to non-Indian reserved rights and the potentially
1<

differentiable role of underground water will be examined.

* The S.G.'s Brief adequately deals with petitioners'
contention that as to non-navigable water state law, rather than
federal law, should determine the federal water right.
Brief for
1 United
States 25-30.
This contention is premised on an
interpretation of the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, 43
U.S.C. § 321, and its statutory predecessors. The contention
previously has been rejected by the Court, see FPC v. Oregon,
349 U.S. 435 (1955), and petitioners have raiSea-no persuasive
reason why it should not be rejected ~gain.

t

3.
Petitioners in part argue that the implied reservation doctrine is
properly applicable only in circumstances involving Indian
lands.

This contention, in its broadest form, can be rejected
In Arizona v. California, supra, at 601,

rather summarily.
';~

seven Justices

apparently agreed with the conclusion of the

Master that the reservption doctrine is applicable to all
federal establishments, not just Indian reservations:
The Master ruled that the principle underlying the reservation of wat er rights for Indian
Reservations was equally applicable to other
federal establishments such as National Recreation
Areas and National Forests. We agree that the
United States intended to reserve water sufficient
for the future requirements of the Lake Mead
National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National
Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife
Refuge and the Gila National Forest.
See also Federal Power Comm'n. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 438, 448

** Moreover,

(1955).

~
notwithstanding precident,
there would appear

----

to be no persuasive reason for limiting the doctrine solely to
Indian lands.

The doctrine is based on the need for the

*

See 373 U.S. at 602; 603; 627. The Chief Justice '
took no part in the case. Justice Douglas dissented and did not
reach this question. Justices Harlan and Stewart, although
dissenting in part, joined this portion of the Court's opinion.
•~ Eight justices apparently shared a similar view in United
States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 522-523(1971

It is clear from our cases that the United States often has
reserved water rights based on withdrawals from the public domain
As we said in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, the Federal
Government had the authority both before and after a State is
aQmitted into the Union "to reserve waters for the use and benefi
of federally reserved lands." Id. at 597. The federally
reserved lands include any fede~l encla ve. In Arizona v.
Ca.lifornia, we were primarily concerned with Indian reservations.
Td. at 398-601. The reservation of waters may be only implied
and the amount will reflect the nature of the federal enclave.
Id. at 600-601.
Justice Harlan joined the opinion of the Court but "explicitly
disclaim[ed] . . . the intimation of any view as to the existence
and scope of the so-called "reserved water rights" of the u.s.,
either ~n general or in the particular situations involved here.

{
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otherwise unappropriated water to accomplish the purposes
underlying the reservation of the public land.

For example,

the reservation of public land, in an arid region, but through
which passes several non-navigable streams, for use as a
national park may be senseless unless there is an implied
reservation of the water rights appurtenant to that land.
Petitioner Nevada and several amici states contend that
the reserved water right doctrine should not be "extended" to
underground water.

Nevada's only significant point with

regard to this proposed distinction is the fact that the
reservation of underground water rights is potentially harsher
on the competing water users since it is more difficult to
determine with any precision the sources and movement of
groundwater.

Moreover, as a consequence of this greater

uncertainty private parties will be less willing to invest in
the arid West in any project which requires a predictable supply
of uninterrupted water since at some point in the future the
reservation doctrine may be used to usurp its water rights.
This is clearly a significant concern.

I

After considering a

number of competing factors, however, I have concluded that
it would be inappropriate to limit the reservation doctrine solely
to surface water.

First, the reservation doctrine appears to

* This, of course, is not to say that reserved
water rights in the context of Indian lands will not be treated
differently from federal water rights in other contextx.
Cf.
Brief for United States 21 n. 13 and sources cited therein.--

:
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be based on the need of the reservation, not the character of
the water reserved.

In Winters v. United States, supra, the

Court recognized the tacit reservation of waters from a
non-navigable stream and sustained an injunction barring
diversions by up-stream land owners.

The reason for the implied

reservation was that the arid land had been reserved for farming,
yet the land would be useless for that
water from the stream.

~ urpose

without the

Assuming that the water had been derived

from wells this "need" principle would still appear to dictate
that the Indians had a r eserved right in any water; otherwise
the reservation of the land would have been useless.
Second, as has been increasingly recognized in the
water laws of the Western states, ground water and surface water
are closely related and interlocking components of the same

~ hydrologic

cycle.

The National Water Commission points out that:

Groundwater and surface water are physically
interrrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle. Groundwater basins feed and are
fed by surface streams. Surface water and
groundwater are interchangeable for most purposes.
Wells deplete surface streams. Depletion of
surface streams depletes water supply to wells.
Optimum utilization of ground and surface water
usually involves conjunctive operation by which
stored ground water supplements and firms up
the supply of intermittently available stream
water. Different rules of law dependent on the
surface or underground point of diversion promote
and perpetuate misallocation of the resource.
Corker, Groundwater Law, Management and Administration, National
Water Commission Legal Study No. 6, pp. xxxiv-xxv (1971).

Although

I certainly am no "hydrologic" expert it does seem to make sense

6.

to treat ground water and surface water the same for most
purposes.

Although it may be difficult to determine the source

of groundwater too much reliance should not be placed on that
fact since most riparian states, including Nevada, recognize
a nd protect appropriate rights to groundwater.

Thus, if some

other neighbor of the Cappaerts were now to drill wells- erroneously
believing that they would not diminish the flow from the
Cappaert wells - and so reduced the water level that the Cappaert
wells could no longer draw, the Cappaerts might then obtain an
injunction against the subsequent user under Nevada law.

*

See

Nev. Rev. Stat. 534.110; In re Waters of Manse Spring, 60 Nev.
280, 286, 108 P. 2d 311, 314 (1940).
Admittedly this analogy to state appropriation law is
not entirely satisfactory for unlike in the case of the United
States it is less likely that the adversely affected water user
will not begin to complain about the diversion of his water
almost immediately after the first diversion occurs.

This is so

because under the prior appropriation theory unless the new user
has some effect on a prior user's water supply he is entitled to

* Moreover, as the S.G. points out in his Brief,
it is not at all clear that the Devils Hole pool should more
properly be categorized as ground or surface water. Brief for
United States 32. It has characteristics of both.

7.

draw as much water as he wishes and may continue to do so
without fear that some other party will assert a valid claim to
all or a portion of his water at some point in the future.

The

special danger represented by the reserved rights doctrine is
that years of investment development may be wiped out because
the United States subsequently asserts a claim to the private user's
water.

But although this problem may be aggravated in the context

of underground water since it is perhaps somewhat more difficult
to predict the sources of supply, this is not a sufficient reason
for retaining the current reservation doctrine with respect
to surface waters but wholly excluding underground water.

It

is, however, a reason for the Court to take special care in this
case to develop and articulate a more precise standard regarding
the critical question of ascertaining how much water a
particular piece of federal land may be said to have reserved
so that potential private users of water resources can plan
with some degree of certainty.
In Arizona v. California, supra, for example, Justice "
Harlan, in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart, although
concurring in that part of the majority opinion which allocated
water to certain Indian reservations, indicated that he did so
"not without some misgivings regarding the amounts of water
allocated to the Indian Reservations."
in part and dissenting in part).

373 U.S. at 603 . (concurring

The majority had adopted the

8.

reasoning of the Master regarding the amount of water intended
to be reserved:
He [Master] found that the water was intended
to satisfy the future as well as the present
needs of the Indian Reservations and ruled that
enough water was reserved to irrigate all the
practically irrigable acreage on the reservations.
Arizona, on the other hand, contends that the
quantity of water reserved should be measured
by the Indians' "reasonably foreseeable needs,'
which, in fact, means by the number of Indians.
How many Indians will there be and what their
future needs can only be guessed. We have
concluded, as did the Master, that the only
feasible and fair way by which r e served water for
the reservations can be measured is by irrigable
acreage.
373 U.S. at 600-601.

Although it is impossible to ascertain

with complete certainty whether Justice Harlan was worried that
too much or too little water was being allocated to the Indians,
viewed in context, I think the only reasonable interpretation of
his statement is that he was concerned that too much water was
being reserved.

Given a vast reservation with only a few Indians

it does seem that the majority allocation scheme is harsh on
competing private users.

This is particularly so given that

the Indian population may never use substantial portions of their
water share yet private investors will be leery of making
substantial investments dependent upon water that may be claimed
at some point in the future.

Of course this problem might in

part be alleviated through sales by the Indians of part of their
water rights to private users.

And the majority approach is not

unreasonable in light of the fact that the reservation doctrine
turns on the intent of the United States in making the original

9.

reservation of land.

Assessing such intent in many instances

is no doubt a hopeless task.

In Arizona the majority may have

felt that even though there were relatively few Indians at the
time of the creation of the Reservations, the United States likely
intended the resident tribes to be self-contained and selfsufficient communities.

In order to provide for the tribes

future development as farmers it was thus reasonable to assume
that the United States intended to reserve sufficient water to
make farming possible on all irrigable portions of the Reservations.
Crops that were not consumed internally might be sold to offReservation consumers in order to obtain cash for the purchase
of manufactured goods.

The majority approach

no doubt also

stems from (1) the unwillingness of the Court to adopt a
reasonably foreseeable test turning on a factor as speculative
as Indian population projections and (2) on the preferred
consideration accorded Indian rights.

Moreover, the majority

approach was appropriate since the test applied there arguably
created relative certainty in the future with regard to the
magnitude of the potential Indian water-rights claims throughout
the West.
A related consideration that should be touched on
briefly is the "necessity" branch of the implied reservation
doctrine.

The reserved water must be necessary to accomplish the-

purpose fur which the land was reserved.

The important point to

be derived from the prior opinions of the Court with regard to

10.

this factor is that the focus appears to be entirely
on the needs of the reservation.
evident in any of the cases.

There is no balancing approach

Thus, although petitioners in

part urge that the needs of the private water users somehow
be balanced against the needs underlying the federal water
reservation, there is no doctrinal support for this position.

-

Moreover, I do not think that the Court should adopt any such
general balancing approach since it would require the federal
courts to engage in value-laden and largely subjective assessments
of the competing merits of various water users.

If the Court is

concerned with the effects of the implied reservation doctrine
on private water users it should instead tightly construe the

---

occasions when implied reservations are created and/or take special
care to limit the quantity of water which it is willing to find
t reserved in a particular reservation.

One alternative would be

to allow the amount of proof required to establish a reservation '
to vary depending upon the nature of the reservation and the
source of the water.

For example, implied reservations in the

context of Indian lands arguably should be construed more liberally
than other federal reservations.

Similarly, as the amici argue,

the existence, extent, and flow of groundwaters underneath reserved
lands likely is far less apparent to Congress at the time of
withdrawal than in the case of surface waters, and therefore it
may be more unreasonable to impute to Congress an intent to reserve

11.

such waters.
But although I find the user distinction attractive,
the surface/ground water distinction seems less appropriate.
For example, if the United States reserved certain lands for
an Indian Reservation I do not think there are persuasive
reasons for applying a stricter burden of proof to showing
the United States intended to reserve sub-surface water.

wh~ ther

Congress

no doubt did not know how much underground water potentially was
available or its sources, but the rationale for the reservation
of surface waters appears to be equally applicable - the United
States must have assumed that sufficient water resources were
obtainable to support the intended agrarian economy.

Even the

reserved user distinction is perhaps of only limited value once
one moves beyond the narrow category of reservations involving
Indians since the reservation doctrine is in many respects a
financial doctrine.

The federal government can always obtain

water rights through its condemnation power.

But it will be

required to compensate existing users for waters diverted.
I also find the alternatiV€ of carefully limiting
the quantity of water reserved to be an attractive means of
limiting the potentially unfair aspects of the implied reservation
doctrine.

For example, in the next decade it is quite likely

that coal-to-gas conversion plants will become operational in
certain parts of the Western states, both on Indian and federal
lands.

It is my understanding that these plants will require

12.

large qunatities of water.

I assume, however, that the prior

appropriation doctrine will not be used to justify creating
a prior Indian or federal interest in a sufficient quantity
of water to operate these plants.

Although the reserved rights

claLmants may no doubt claim that in reserving certain lands
for Indians the United States intended that enough water be
reserved to develop all the resources of the reservation I would
find this an inappropriate extension of the doctrine since it
would seem manifestly unfair to private water users.

Although

the Arizona Court rejected a "reasonably foreseeable" test
turning on projected Indian population a foreseeability test
turning on expected land usage seems appropriate.

The Arizona

( ourt in fact applied a foreseeability test of this type by
focusing on the number of potentially irrigable acres agriculture being the intended use to which the land was to be put
at the tLme of the reservation.
II.

Intent/Necessity:
Application of the intent/necessity test must begin

with consideration of the question whether under The Act for
the Preservation of American Antiquities, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33,
President Truman was authorized to reserve the waters contained
in Devil's Hole in order to protect an endangered species of
pupfish.

This is a very close question.

The Antiquities Act

vests the President with authority to:
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other

13.

objects of historic or scientific interest
that are situated upon lands owned or controlled
by the Government of the United States to be
national monuments . . . .
§ 432.

From the face of the statute, particularly when viewed

in the conjunction with the other operative sections, it is
difficult to find an intent by Congress to authorize the President

----

to take steps to preserve a species of wildlife, however, rare.
The brief legislative history of the Act supports an even narrower
interpretation of its purpose than the language itself.

Examination

of that history reveals that Congress was concerned with the
preservation of objects of antiquity, mainly the historic and
·'"'
prehistoric ruins of various Indian
civilizations located
.,

throughout the Southwest.

SeeS. rep. No. 3797, 59th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 2224, 59th Cong., 1st Sess (1906).
Despite any difficulty I might have as an original matter in
construing the Act in a manner so as to justify the implied
reservation of the water-pupfish habitat a prior decision of

-------

this Court does appear to advance significantly the argument
for finding an implied reservation power under the Act.

In

Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920), the Court sustained
the power of the President under the Antiquitie s Act to establish

-

the Grand Canyon National Monument:
The defendants insist that the monument reserve
should be disregarded on the ground that there was
no authority for its creation. To this we cannot
assent. The act under which the President proceeded
empowered him to establish reserves embracing "objects
of historic or scientific int erest." The Grand Canyon,
as stated in his proclamation, "is an object of
unusual scientific interest."

14.

Id. at 455-56.

Although the Grand Canyon is certainly a more

important and well known object of historic and scientific
intere st than Devil's Hole it is also true that Devil's Hole
can be fairly characterized as an object of "scientific
interest" so that its change in status to a monument reserve
was authorized by the Act.

The essential question still remabs,

however, whether the power to reserve objects of "scientific
interest" such as the Grand Canyon or Devil's Hole embraced the
power to reserve the water rights involved here.

My current

feeling is that the power to create an implied reservation of
water rights is present whenever the presence of the water is
necessary to ensure one of the prime reasons for the objects'
scientific value.
In the case of the Grand Canyon, although the principal
reason for considering it an object of scientific interest is
its present configuration as a mile-deep canyon whose walls reveal
several million years of geologic history, I think that the
proclamation establishing it as a monument reserve likely can
;

~

also be fairly interpreted as embracing the water flowing
through the Canyon.

This river of water was the driving force

behind the Canyon's formation and should fairly be regarded as a
key component of its continuing historical or scientific

value

since it serves as a reminder of the forces which led to the Canyon's
formation, and more important, contributes to its continued
deepening.

Consequently, application of the implied reservation
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doctrine to the waters of the Canyon would likely lead to
the result that the United States could enjoin other users of
the Colorado River if their activities unduely impeded the
natural flow of the river.
A similar chain of logic could be applied to the Devil's
Hole Proclamation of President Truman.

Broadly read the

Antiquities Act authorized him to reserve objects of scientific
interest.

There is no serious contention that Devil's Hole

as a geologic formation falls into that category.

The issue

then becomes (1) whether the pool and the resident pupfish are
key components which make an important contribution to the
scientific value of Devil's Hole so as to be encompassed within
the broad power to preserve objects of scientific interest conferred
by the Antiquities Act and (2) whether President Truman's
Proclamation, fairly read, can be construed as embracing an
implied reser vation of sufficient water in the pool for the
pupfish to survive.

My tentative answer to both these questions '

is Yes, although I recognize that a defensible opinion could
be written which reached an opposite result.
the chain is the toughest to forge.

The first link in

There is no clear statutory

language or legislative history to support its creation.

Finding

the power turns on how broadly the Court is willing to interpret
the power to establish as national monuments "objects of . . .
scientific interest."

The Cameron decision appears to support a
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broad construction of the statute .with regard to the types
of objects of scientific interest which fairly may be encompassed
within the Act.

And although the petitioners raise a number of

nonfrivolous contentions with regard to the absence of any
general power under the Act to take actions with respect to
wildlife, I do not find them controlling given what I regard
as the unique linkage between the pool as a geologic formation
and the continuing existence of the pupfish as its sole inhabitants.
It is this linkage between the pupfish and the pool which
establishes Devil's Hole as an object of scientific interest.
Establishing the second link in the chain is
substantially easier.

The Truman Proclamation in part provided

that:
Whereas, there is located outside the
boundaries of the said monument [Death Valley]
but in the vicinity thereof a forty-acre tract
of public land in Nevada containing a remarkable
underground pool known as Devil's Hole; and
Whereas, the said pool is a unique subsurface
remant of the prehistoric chain of lakes which
in Pleistocene times formed the Death Valley
Lake System, and is unusual among caverns in
that it is a solution area in distinctly striated
limestone, while also owing its formation in part
to fault action; and

. ·'
'

Whereas the geologic evidence that this subterranean pool is an integral part of the hydrographic history of the Death Valley region is further
confirmed by the presence in this pool of a peculiar
( race of desert fish, and zoologists have demonstrated
\ that this race of fish, which is found nowhere else
in the world, evolved only after t e gradual drying
up of the Death Valley Lake System isolated this fish
population from the original ancestral stock that in
Pleistocene times was common to the entire region, and

~

17.
Whereas the said pool is of such outstanding
scientific importance that it should be given
special protection, and such protection can be
best afforded by making the said forty-acre
tract containing the pool a part of the said
monument . . . .
Warning is hereby expressly given to all
unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure,
destroy, or remove any feature of this addition
to the said monument and not to locate or settle
on any of the lands thereof.
Although it is possible to read the Proclamation so as to protect
the continued existence of the pool, but not the "peculiar race
of fish" which is its sole inhabitant, I find that interpretation
unacceptable.

-

The fate of the pool and the fish are so closely

intertwined that to s peak of protecting the continued existence
of one without considering the existence of the other is strained.
To be sure the Proclamation emphasizes "the pool" rather than
the fish that live in it but preservation of the pool in its
natural state - a direct purpose of the Act - will also preserve
the fish.*

Indeed, as the S.G. points out, it is difficult

* Cons ider the fact that even if the linkage of
the pool and the fish is not accepted, the ability of the fish to
survive may play a role in the determination of the amount of reserved
water. The Proclamation clearly indicates an interest in preserving
the pool. Assuming there is no direct interest in preserving the
fish, one measure of whether pumping by other water consumers lowers
the level of the pool an impermissible amount below its original
or natural level would be the inability of the fish to survive.
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to think of a reservation that would more clearly carry with it
a reservation of water rights.

Assuming that the validity of

the conclusions thus far developed, application of the intent/
necessity standard inexorably leads to the conclusion that the
United States intended to reserve sufficient water in the pool
to ensure the survival of the pupfish.

Consequently, the DC

injunction, which limited pumping from specifically designated
wells within a two and one-half-mile radius of Devil's Hole
so as to preserve an adequate water supply for the pupfish was
entirely appropriate.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 74-1107

AND

74-1304

Francis Leo Cappaert et al.,
Petitioners,
74-1107
v.
On Writs of Certiorari o
United States et al.
the United States Court
Nevada ex rel. Roland D.
of Appeals for the Ninth
Westergard, State EngiCircuit.
neer, Petitioner,
74-1304
v.
United States et al.
[May -, 1976]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the
reservation of Devil's Hole as a National Monument re~
served federal water rights in underground water.
Devil's Hole is a deep limestone cavern. Approximately 50 feet below the surface of the cavern is a pool
65 feet long, 10 feet wide and at least 200 feet deep, although its actual depth is unknown. The pool is a remnant of the prehistoric Death Valley Lake System. By
the Proclamation of January 17, 1952, President Truman
withdrew from the public domain a 40-acre tract of land
surrounding Devil's Hole , making it a detached component of the Death Valley National Monument. Proclamation No. 2961, 66 Stat. C18, 17 Fed. Reg. 691. 1 The
1
The final paragraph of the Proclamation withdrawing Devil's
Hole from the public domam reads as follows :
"Now, Therefore, I , Harry S. Truman, President of the United
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Proclamation was issued under the Act for the Preserva~
tion of American Antiquities, 16 U. S. C. § 431, 34 Stat.
225, which authorizes the President to declare as national
monuments "objects of historic or scientific interest that
are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States. . . . "
The 1952 Proclamation notes that Death Valley was
set aside as a national monument "for the preservation
of the unusua.l features of scenic, scientific, and educa~
tional interest therein contained." The Proclamation
also notes that Devil's Hole is near Death Valley and
contains a "remarkable underground pool." Additional
preambular statements in the Proclamation explain why
Devil's Hole was being added to the Death Valley N ationa.! Monument:
"Whereas the said pool is a unique subsurface
remnant of the prehistoric chain of lakes which in
Pleistocene times formed the Death Valley Lake
System, and is unusual among caverns in that it is
a solution area in distinctly straited limestone, while
also owing its formation in part to fault action; and
"Whereas the geologic evidence that this subter~
ranean pool is an integral part of the hydrographic
States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in
me by section 2 of the act of June 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 225 (16 U.S. C.
431), do proclaim that, subject to the provisions of the act of Congress approved June 13, 1933, 48 Stat. 139 ( 16 U. S. C. 447), and
to all valid existing rights, the following-described tract of land in
Nevada is hereby added to and reserved as a part of the Death
Valley National Monument, as a detached unit thereof:
"Mount Diablo Meridian, Nevada T . 17 S., R. 50#., sec. 36, SW
%. SE 14.
"Warning is hereby expressly given to all unauthorized persons
not to appropnate, innure, destroy, or remove any feature of this
addition to the said monument and not to locate or settle on any
of the lands thereof."
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history of the Death Valley region is further confirmed by the presence in this pool of a peculiar race
of de~ert fish, and zoologists ha.ve demonstrated that
this race of fish, which is found nowhere else in the
world, evolved only after the gradual drying up of
the Death Valley Lake System isolated this fish
population from the original ancestr9J stock that in
Pleistocene times was common to the en tire region;
and
"Whereas the said pool is of such outstanding
scientific importance that it should be given special
protection, and such protection can be best afforded
by making the said forty-acre tract containing the
pool a part of the said monument . ..."
The Proclamation provides that Devil's Hole should
be supervised, managed and directed by the National
Park Service, Department of Interior. Devil's Hole is
fenced off and only limited 'access is allowed by the Park
Service.
The Cappaert petitioners own a 12,000-acre ranch near
Dcvil's Hole, 4,000 acres of which are used for growing
Bermuda grass, alfalfa, wheat, and barley; 1,700 to
1,800 head of cattle are grazed. The ranch represents
an investment of more than 7 million dollars; it employs
more than 80 people with an annual payroll of more
than $340,000.
In 1968 the Cappaerts began pumping groundwater on
their ranch on land two and one-half miles from Devil's
Hole; they were the first owners to appropriate water.
The groundwater comes from an underground basin or
acquifer which is also the source of the water in Devil's
Hole. After the Cappaerts began pumping from the
wells ncar Devil's Hole, which they do from March to
October, the summer water level of the pool in Devil's
Hole began to decrease . Since 1962 the level of water

74-1107 & 74-1304-0PINION
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in Devil's Hole has been measured with reference to a
copper washer installed on one of the walls of the hole
by the U. S. Geological Survey. Until 1968, the water
level, with seasonable variations, had been stable at 1.2
feet below the copper marker. In 1969 the water level
in Devil's Hole was 2.3 feet below the copper washer; in
1970, 3.17 feet; in 1971, 3.48 feet; and, in 1972, 3.93 feet.
When the water is at the lowest levels, a large portion
of a rock shelf in Devil's Hole is above water. However,
when the water level is at 3.0 feet below the marker or
higher, most of the rock shelf is below water, enabling
algae to grow on it. This in turn enables the desert
pupfish, referred to in President Truman's Proclamation,
to spawn in the spring. As the rock shelf becomes ex~
posed, the spawning area is decreased, reducing the ability of the fish to spawn in sufficient quantities to prevent
extinction.
In April 1970 the Cappaerts, pursuant to Nevada law,
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.325, applied to the State Engineer,
Roland D. Westergard, for permits to change the use
of water from several of their wells. Although the
United States was not a party to that proceeding and
was never served, employees of the National Park Service learned of the Cappaerts' application through a
public notice published pursuant to Nevada law. Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 533.360. An official of the National Park
Service filed a protest as did a private firm. Nevada
law permits mterested persons to protest an application
for a permit; the protest may be considered by the State
Engineer at a hearing. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.365. A
hearing was conducted on December 16, 1970, and a field
solicitor of the Department of Interior appeared on behalf of the National Park Service. He presented documentary and testimonial evidence, informing the State
Engineer that because of the declining water level of
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Devil's Hole the United States had commissioned a
study to determine whether the wells on the Cappaerts
land were hydrologically connected to Devil's Hole and,
if so, which of those wells could be pumped safely and
which should be limited to prevent lowering of the water
level in Devil's Hole. The Park Service field solicitor
requested either that the Cappaerts' application be denied or that decision on the application be postponed
until the studies were completed.
The State Engineer declined to postpone decision.
At the conclusion of the hearing he stated that there was
no recorded federal water right with respect to Devil's
Hole, that the testimony indicated that the Cappaerts'
pumping would not unreasonably lower the water table
or adversely affect existing water rights, and that the
permit would be granted since further economic development of the Cappaert's land would be in the public in-·
terest. In his oral ruling the State Engineer stated in
part "that the protest to the applications that are the
subject of this hearing are overruled and the applications will be issued subject to existing rights." The N ationa! Park Service did not appeal. See N. R. S.
§ 533.450.
In August 1971 the United States, invoking 28 U. S. C.
§ 1345, 62 Stat. 933/ sought an mjunction in the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada to limit,
except for domestic purposes, the Cappaerts' pumping
from six specific wells and from specific locations near
Devil's Hole. The complaint alleged that the United
States, in establishing Devil's Hole as part of Death
28 U . S. C . § 1345 provides as follows .
"Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district
courts shall have original jurisdictwn of all civil actions, suits or
proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or
officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress."
2

...
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Valley National Monument, reserved the unappropriated
waters appurtenant to the land to the extent necessary
for the requirements and purposes of the reservation.
The complaint further alleged that the Cappaerts had
no perfected water rights as of the date of the reservation. The United States asserted that pumping from
certain of the Cappaerts' wells had lowered the water
level in Devil's Hole, that the lower water level was
threatening the survival of a unique species and that
irreparable harm would follow if the pumping were not
enjoined. On June 2, 1972, the United States filed an
amended complaint, adding two other specified wells to
the list of those to be enjoined.
The Cappaerts answered, admitting that their wells
draw water from the same underlying sources supplying Devil's Hole, but denying that the reservation of
Devil's Hole reserved any water rights for the United
States. The Cappaerts alleged that the United States
was estopped from enjoining use of water under land
which it had exchanged with the Cappaerts. The State
of Nevada intervened on behalf of the State Engineer
as a party defendant but raised no affirmative defenses.
On June 5, 1973, the District Court, by Chief Judge
Roger D. Foley, entered a preliminary injunction limiting pumping from designated wells so as to return the
level of Devil's Hole to not more than 3.0 feet below
the marker. Detailed findings of fact were made and
the District Judge then appointed a Special Master to
establish specific pumping limits for the wells and to
monitor the level of the water at Devil's Hole. The
District Court found that the water from certain of the
wells was hydrologically connected to Devil's Hole, that
the Cappaerts were pumping heavily from those wells, and
that that pumping had lowered the water level in Devil's
Hole. The Court found that the pumping could be

'1.4-1107 & 74-1304-0PINION
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regulated to stabilize the water level at Devil's Hole and
that neither establishing an artificial shelf nor transplanting the fish was a feasible alternative that would
preserve the species. The District Court found that if
the injunction did not issue "there is grave danger that
the Devil's Hole pupfish may be destroyed, resulting in
irreparable injury to the United States."
The District Court then held that in establishing
Devil's Hole as a National Monument, the President
reserved appurtenant, unappropriated waters necessary
to the purpose of the reservation ; the purpose included
preservation of the pool and the pupfish in it. The
District Court held that the federal 'Water rights antedated those of the Cappaerts, that the United States was
not estopped and that the public interest required granting the injunction. On April 9, 1974, the District Court
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law substantially unchanged in a final decree permanently enjoining pumping that lowers the level of the water
below the 3.0 foot level. 375 F. Supp. 456 (Nev. 1974).
The Court M Appeals for the Ninth Circuit· affirmed,
508 F. 2d 313 ( 1974) ,3 in a thorough opinion by Senior
District Judge Gus J. Solomon, sitting by designation,
holding that the implied reser vation of water doctrine
applied to groundwater as well as to surface water. The
Court of Appeals held that " [ t] he fundamental purpose
of the reservation of the Devil's Hole pool was to assure
that the pool would not suffer changes from its condition
at the time the Proclamation was issued in 1952 ...."
508 F . 2d, at 318. The Court of Appeals held that

''

··'

.. ,
··,
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·'",.

.•
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3 Pending appeal, the Court of Appeals, in response to a motion
from the Cappaerts to modify the injunction to permit them to
pump to 3.7 feet below the copper water level, had permitted the
Cappaerts to pump so long as the water level did not drop more
th~tn q.Q f~f;lt belQW the marker. 483 F , 2d 432 (1973).

'·'·
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neither the Cappaerts nor their successors in interest had
any water rights in 1952, nor was the United States
estopped from asserting its water rights by exchanging
land with the Cappaerts. In answer to contentions
raised by the intervenor Nevada, the Court of Appeals
held that the United States is not bound by state water
law as to lands reserved from the public domain and does
not need to take steps to perfect its rights with the State;
that the District Court had concurrent jurisdiction with
he state courts to resolve this claim; and, that the state
administrative procedures granting the Cappaert's per·
mit did not bar resolution of the United States' suit in
Federal District Court.
We granted the writ of certiorari in this case to con·
sider the scope of the implied reservation of water rights
doctrine. 422 U.S. 1041 (1975). We affirm.

I
Reserved Water Rights Doctrine

I

This Court has long held that when the Federal Gov·
ernment withdraws its land from the public domain and
reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappro·
priated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose
of the reservation. Reservation of water rights is em·
powered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which
permits federal regulations of navigable streams, and the
Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal
regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to
Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encom·
passing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable
streams. Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States,- U.S.-, [p. 4] (1976); United Sbt/$s
v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U. S. 520, ~22523 ( 1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 601

.,;,

..,
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(1963); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U. S. 435 (1955); United
States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) .4
Nevada argues that the cases establishing the doctrine
of federal reserved water rights articulate an equitable
doctrine calling for a balancing of competing interests.
However, an examination of those cases shows they do not
analyze the doctrine in terms of a balancing test. For
example, in Winters v. United States, supra, the Court
did not mention the use made of the water by the upstream landowners in sustaining an injunction barring
their diversions of the water. The "Statement of the
Case" in Winters notes that the upstream users were
homesteaders who had invested heavily in dams to divert
the water to irrigate their land, not an unimportant interest. The Court held that when the Federal Government reserv·es land, by implication it reserves water
rights sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the
reservation. ~

In determining ·whether there is a federally reserved
water right implicit in a federal reservation of public
The Cappaerts argue that as to nonnavigable waters, the implied
reservation doctrine properly applies only to Indian reservations due
to ,the sovereign nature and ward statu~ of Indian tribes; thus, FPC
v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), must be overruled. We disagree.
Navigability or nonnav1gability of water is Irrelevant for the application of the implied reservatiOn doctrine, see ante, at [29, this·
copy] . This court has ·held that the doctrine applies both to Indian reservations and other federal enclave:;. E. g., A.rizona v.
Califorma, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
G Nevada IS askmg, m effect, that the Court overrule Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), and United States v. District Court
for the County of Eagle, 401 U. S. 520 (1971), to the extent that
they hold that the Implied reservation doctrine applies to all federal
enclaves since in so holding those cases did not balance the "competmg equities:" Nevada's Brief, at 15. However, since balancing the
'equities is not the test, tho&J cases need not be disturbed.
4

,·
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land, the issue is whether the Government intended to
reserve iinappropilated: and tn us availaore- water. I nte"iit IS inferred ii1he previo~unappropriated waters
are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the
reservation was created. See, e. g., Arizona v. California,
373 U.S., at 599-601; Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.,
at 576. Both the District Court and Court of Appeals
held that the 1952 Proclamation expressed an intention
to reserve unappropriated water and we agree. 6 The
Proclamation discussed the pool in Devil's Hole in four
of the five preambles and recited that the "pool . . .
should be given special protection." Since a pool is a
body of water, the protection contemplated is mean"
ingful only if the water remains; the water right reserved by the 1952 Proclamation was thus explicit, not
implied.7
Also explicit in the 1952 Proclamation is the authority
of the Director of the Park Service to manage the lands
of Devil's Hole Monument "as provided in the act of
Congress entitled 'An Act to establish a National Park
Service, and for other purposes,' approved August 25, 1916
(39 Stat. 535; 16 U. S. C. 1-3) . . . . " The National
Park Service Act provides that the "fundamental purpose
of said national parks, monuments, and reservations" is
"to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic
objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
6 The implied reservation of water doctrine applies only to unappropnated waters. The water rights at issue here were unappropriated m 1952 since neither the Cappaerts nor their successors in
interest had beneficially diverted any water as of that date. See n.
8, infra.
7 The 1952 Proclamation forbids unauthorized persons to "appropriate, mure, destroy, or remove any feature" from the reservation.
Since water is a "feature" of the reservation, the Cappaerts, by their
pumping, are m a sense "appropnating" or "removing" this feature
in violation of the Proclamation

74-!107 & 74-1304-0PINION'
CAPPAERT v. UNITEP STATES

11

enjoyment of the same in such manner and· by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations." 16 U. S. C. § 1.
The implied reservation of water doctrine, however,
reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation, no more. Arizona v.
California, 373 U. S., at 600-601. Here the purpose of
the reservation is preservation of the pool. Devil's Hole
Monument was reserved "for the preservation of the
unusual features of scenic, scientific, and educational interest." The Proclamation notes that the pool contains
"a peculiar race of desert fish ... which is found nowhere
else in the world" and that the "pool is of ... outstanding scientific importance ...." The pool need only be
preserved, consistent with the intention expressed in the
Proclamation, to the extent that its scientific interest is
preserved. The fish are one of the features of scientific
interest. The preamble noting the scientific interest of
the pool follows the preamble describing the fish as
unique; the Proclamation must be read in its entirety.
Thus, as the District Court has correctly determined, the
level of the pool may be permitted to drop to the extent
that the drop does not impair the scientific value of the
pool as the natural habitat of the species sought to be
preserved. The District Court thus tailored its injunction, very appropriately, to minimal need, curtailing
pumping only to the extent necessary to preserve an adequate water level at Devil's Hole, thus implementing
the stated objectives of the Proclamation.
Both petitioners argue that even if the intent of the
1952 Proclamation were to maintain the pool, the Act
for the Protection of American Antiquities, 34 Stat. 225,
16 U. S. C. §§ 431-433, did not give the President authority to reserve a pool. Under that Act, according to the
C~ppaert petitioners, the President may reserve federal

14-:1107 ~ 74-1304-0PINION
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lands only to protect archeologic sites. However, thE(
ianguage of the Act which authorizes the President to
proclairr;_ as national monuments "historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and objects of historic
or scientific interest that are situated upon the land~
pwned or controlled by the Government" is not so lim.:r
ited. The pool in Devil's Hole and its rare inhabitant~
~re "objects of historic and scientific interest." See gen;
erally Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 451-456
1920).
II

t

Groundwater

/

No cases of this Court have applied the doctrine of
implied reservation of ~ater rights to groundwater.
Nevada argues that the implied reservation doctrine is
limited to surface water. To recognize such a distinc-/
tion, however, would be to_exalt form over substance
since "groundwater and surface water are physically in..,
terrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle."
Corker, Groundwater lfaw, Management and Adminjstration, National Water Commission Legal Study No.
6, p. xxiv (1971). Depletion of water from one sourc~
will deplete .it from the other. Ibid. See also Water
Policies for the Future-Final Report to the President
and to the Congress of the United States by the National Water Commission 233 (1973). For example 1
Nevada itself must recognize the interrelationship since
it applies the law of prior appropriation to both groundwater and surface water. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 533.010 et
seq. ; 534.020; 534.080; 534.090. 8 See also State v. Dar-

.·

8

Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the first to divert.
and use water beneficially establishes a right to continued use of
the water. The right exists only as long as the water is beneficially diverted. See Colorado River Water Conservation District v.

..
''

..

7'4--1107' & 7'4-1304-.ClPINION
CAPPAERT v. UNITED STATES

13

ity, 55 N. M. 12, 27, 225 P. 2d 1007, 1016 ( 1950), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question
sub nom. Dority v. New Mexico ex rel. Bliss, 341 U. S,
924 (1951). Thus, since the implied reservation of
water doctrine is based on the necessity of water for
the purpose of the federal reservation and since ground-·
water and surface water are interrelated, we hold that
the existence of the water right does not vary as the
source of the water varies. 0

III
State Law

Both petitioners argue that the Federal Government
must perfect its implied water rights according to state
law. They contend that the Desert Land Act of 1877,
19 Stat. 377, 43 U. S. C. § 321 and its predecessors 1 ()
United States, -

U. S. - , [3-4] (1976).

Nev. Rev. Stat.
Sax, Water Law,
Planning and Policy-Ca.~es and Materials, 218-224 (1968).
9 Both petitioners argue that the effect of applying the implied
reservation doctrine to groundwater is to prohibit pumping from
the entire 4500 acres above tho aquifer which supplies water to
Devil's Hole. First, it must be emphasized that the injunction
limits but does not prohibit pumping.~ Second, the finclings of
fact in this case relate only to wells within two and one-half miles
of Devil's Hole. No proof was introduced in the District Court
that pumping from the same aquifer which supplies Devil's Hole,
but at a greater distance from Devil's Hole, would significantly
lower the level in Devil's Hole. Nevada notes that such pumping
"will in t1me affect the water level in Devil's Hole." Brief, at 25.
There was testimony from a research hydrologist that substantial
pumping 40 miles away "over a period of decades [would have] a
small effect." Appendix, at 79.
10 The predece8sors to the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377,
43 U. S. C. § 321, are the Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 251, and
the Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 217. Those Acts provide that
water rights vested under state Jaw or custom are protected. How~

§§ 533.010 et seq.; 534.020; 534.080; 534.090.

74-1107 & 74-1304-0PINION
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severed nonnavigable water from public land, subjecting
it to state law. That Act, however, provides only that
water rights on public land-land that is either patented
to a private homesteader or patentable but not reserved-are to be acquired by prior appropriation as determined by state law. California Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142, 154155 (1935); see Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over
Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying
Legislation," 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 423, 432 (1966).11 This
Court held in FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955),
ever, the Cappaerts did not have any vested water rights in 1952.
See n. 6, supra.
11 The cases relied upon by the Cappaerts are not to the contrary.
E. g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725
(1950); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937); California Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 275 U. S. 142 (1935).
Dority v. New Mexico ex rel. Bliss, 341 U. S. 924 (1951). None
involve a federal reservation and all involve a determination
whether wa,ter rights had vested under state law. Here a Federal
reservation is involved and neither the Cappaerts nor their predecessors in interest had any vested water rights in 1952 when the
United Statet!water rights vested.
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945), also relied upon
by the Cappaerts, involved a federal reservation pursuant to the
Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388, which directs the
Secretary of Interior to "proceed in conformity with [State]
laws" ' a.nd which provides that "the right to the use of wa.ter acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure,
and the limit of the right." In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the court
noted that the United States had acted in conformity with state
law. The court said, "We intimate no opinion whether a different
procedure might ha.ve been followed so as to appropriate and reserve to the United States all of these water rights. No such attempt was made ." 325 U. S., at 615. Here the United States
acquired reserved water rights through a reservation authorized
not by the Reclamation Act, but by the Antiquities Act.

J"

>

..
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under 28 U. S. C. § 1345 to adjudicate the water rights·
claims of the United States.' 8 Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States,- U. S., at [5-·
8]. · The McCarran amendment, 43 U. S. C. § 666, 66;
Stat. 560, did not repeal § 1345 jurisdiction as applied to
water rights. Ibid. Nor, as Nevada suggests, is the .
McCarren amendment a substantive statute, requiring:
tbe United. States to "perfect its water rights in the
state forum like all other land owners." Nevada's Brief,
at 37. The McCarren amendment merely waives
United States' sovereign immunity should the United.
States be joined as a party in a state court general water
rights' adjudication. Colorado River Water Conserva-·
t'ion District v. United States, U. S., at [p. 6-7] .·

VI
Res Judicata
Finally Nevada, as intervenor in the Cappaerts' suit,.
argued in the Court of Appeals that the United States·
was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel from
litigating its water rights claim in federal court. Nevada bases this conclusion on the fact that the National
Park Service filed a protest to the Cappaerts' pumping·
permit application in the state administrative proceeding. Since we reject that contention, we need not consider whether the issue was timely and properly raised.
We note only that the United States was not made a
party to the state administrative proceeding; 14 nor was·
the United States in privity with the Cappaerts. ~lee'
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320-326 (1911). Wher:t
uSee n. 2, supra.
The cases petitioners rely upon involve parties who have coi~
iatera.lly attacked an administrative determination. Here the
Uhited States was never a party.
14
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the United States appeared to protest in the state proceeding it did not assert any federal water right claims,
nor did it seek to adjudicate any cla.ims until the hydrological studies as to the effects of the Cappaerts' pumping had been completed. 1 " The fact that the United
States did not attempt to adjudicate its water rights in
the state proceeding is not significant since the United
States was not a party. The State Water Engineer's
decree explicitly stated that it was "subject to existing
rights"; thus, the issue raised in the District Court was
not decided in the proceedings before the State Engineer.
See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S., at 323. Cf. United States
v. Utah Construction & Mi,ning Co., 384 U. S. 394, 422.
We hold, therefore, that as of 1952 when the United
States reserved Devil's Hole, it acquired by reservation,
water rights in unappropriated appurtenant groundwater sufficient to maintain the level of the pool to preserve its historic value and thereby implement Proclamation No. 2961. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

15 The United States requested either that the permits be denied
or decision postpom'd until the studies were complete. While the
State Engineer did not postpone deci, ion on the permit application,
the Cappacrts' attorney ~a id that the ,;tudies "w111 go forward
whether or not the applications are granted; so let's not make
the mistake of thinking that if the.::~e applications are granted the
studies are moot, they alr(' .ooi .'' App , 307.
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CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 20, 1976
Re:

74-1107 - Cappaert, et al. v. United States
74-1304 - Nevada, ex rel Westergard, etc. v.
United States

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 20, 1976

Nos. 74-1107 and 74-1304
Cappaert v. United States
Dear Chief,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in these cases.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS 01"

-JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 24, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 - Cappaert v. United States

Dear Chief:
Except for Part II dealing with ground water, I am in
substantial agreement with your circulating opinion in this
case. As to Part II, however, it seems unnecessary to go
farther than holding that reserved water rights may not be
defeated by a subsequent appropriation of ground water on
which the reserved rights are shown to depend. I would prefer to avoid laying down the general proposition that because
"ground water and surface water are interrelated--the existence of the water right -does not vary as the source of the
water varies."
Ground and surface water are not always interrelated;
and where they are not, I would withhold opinion on whether a
shortage of surface water in dry years may be cured by drilling and pumping or diverting unrelated ground water to the
detriment of prior rights dependent on that water. Query,
for example: whether water rights impliedly reserved by the
creation of an Indian reservation would give the United States
and its wards the right to drill for and appropriate ground
water that until that time had no surface manifestation but
has been subject to prior appropriation by those owning nonreservation land beneath which the underground pool or stream
also lies or runs.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference
P.S.

The attached article from a country newspaper in Colorado indicates the immediate impact of our recent
decisions on the allocation of a scarce resource, as
well as the proclivity of some government agencies to
attempt to turn an inch into a mile.

B.R.W.
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 25, 1976

..
Re:

Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 - Cappaert v. United States

Dear Chief:
I agree with Byron's observations about this case,
including his comments about Part II.
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Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR .

May 28, 1976

'•

RE: Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304

Cappaert and Nevada ex rel.
Westergard v. United States, et al.

Dear Chief:
'

I agree.

'

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

~...

.

<!Jtntrlttf t.It.t ~ttit.tb' ~fattg
~M!rittghm. ~. <!J. 2ll.;tJ.1.;l

.:§ttp"tmtt

CHAMB E RS OF

May 31,

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:
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No. 74-1107
Cappaertv. UnitedStates
No. 74-1304 - Nevada v. United States

.

Dear Chief:

.•.

Please join me in your recirculation of May 28.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
' " cc:

The Conference
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JUSTIC E BYRON R . WHITE

June 2, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 - Cappaert v. U. S.

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

p;~
I

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference
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June 2, 1976

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

He:

No. 74-1107 -- Cappaert v. United States
No. 74-1304 -- Nevada v. United States

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
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The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

I

;§u.prttttt

QfO'Url o-f tltt ~tb ;§bdr.o-

jilas!p:n:gton. ~. "f. 2llp~~

)

CHAMBERS OF
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June 3, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1107 &. 74-1304 - Cappaert v. United States

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

l

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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